Preemption Contests Between Groups
Kai Konrad () and
David A. Malueg
No 13738, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We consider a preemption game between groups where the first agent to take a costly action wins the prize on behalf of his group. We describe the equilibrium solution of this problem when players differ in their own costs of action and these costs are private information. The equilibrium is typically characterized by delay. The nature of the equilibrium depends on key parameters such as the number of groups and their size. More competition between groups reduces delay, whereas in larger groups members of a given cost type are more reluctant to act but may yield an earlier resolution of the conflict. We analyze asymmetries across groups, focusing on group size and strength of the externalities within groups.
Keywords: dynamic conflict; free riding; incomplete information; inter-group conflict; preemption; waiting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H41 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
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