On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries
Damian Damianov () and
Ronald Peeters ()
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 150, issue C, 73-76
We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets.
Keywords: Charity lotteries; Ticket sales; Disclosure policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D62 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:73-76
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