On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

Damian Damianov and Ronald Peeters

No 30, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets.

JEL-codes: D44 D62 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01-01
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https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/5241651/RM16030.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016030

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2016030

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