Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret

Vladislav Damjanovic

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 150, issue C, 99-103

Abstract: For Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games.

Keywords: Adaptive heuristics; Regret matching; Coarse-correlated equilibrium; Traveler’s Dilemma game; Minimal effort coordination game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Two "Little Treasure Games" driven by Unconditional Regret (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:99-103

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.003

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