Two "Little Treasure Games" driven by Unconditional Regret

Vladislav Damjanovic

No 2016_06, CEMAP Working Papers from Durham University Business School

Abstract: For Traveller’s Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games

Keywords: Adaptive Heuristics; Regret Matching; Coarse-Correlated Equilibrium; Traveller’s Dilemma Game; Minimal Effrot Coordination Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret (2017)
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