Two "Little Treasure Games" driven by Unconditional Regret
Vladislav Damjanovic ()
No 2016_06, CEGAP Working Papers from Durham University Business School
For Traveller’s Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games
Keywords: Adaptive Heuristics; Regret Matching; Coarse-Correlated Equilibrium; Traveller’s Dilemma Game; Minimal Effrot Coordination Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/business/research/TwoLittleGamesURM.pdf main text (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dur:cegapw:2016_06
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEGAP Working Papers from Durham University Business School Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, England. Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Tatiana Damjanovic ().