Asymmetric social norms

Gabriele Camera and Alessandro Gioffré

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 152, issue C, 27-30

Abstract: Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.

Keywords: Cooperation; Repeated games; Social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516305341
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric Social Norms (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:27-30

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.025

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().