Asymmetric Social Norms

Gabriele Camera and Alessandro Gioffré

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.

Keywords: cooperation; repeated games; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-soc
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http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... ric-social-norms.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric social norms (2017)
Working Paper: Asymmetric social norms (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:16-30

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