Polarization in strategic networks

Steven Kivinen

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 154, issue C, 81-83

Abstract: A model of social learning and strategic network formation is developed with distance-based utility and cognitive dissonance. For intermediate costs, stable networks exhibit realistic properties and belief polarization increases with small increases in available information.

Keywords: Social learning; Network formation; Cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Polarization in Strategic Networks (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:81-83

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.032

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