Polarization in Strategic Networks

Steven Kivinen

Working Papers from Dalhousie University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A model of social learning and strategic network formation is developed with distance-based utility and cognitive dissonance. For intermediate costs, stable networks exhibit realistic properties and belief polarization increases with small increases in available information.

Keywords: Social Learning; Network Formation; Cooperative Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2017-02-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics Letters, May 2017, pages 81

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http://wp.economics.dal.ca/RePEc/dal/wpaper/DalEconWP2017-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Polarization in strategic networks (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dal:wpaper:daleconwp2017-01

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