Self-organizing teams

Matthias Kräkel

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 159, issue C, 195-197

Abstract: In the past decades, firms have decided to replace part of their hierarchical structure by self-organizing teams whose members have been authorized to match themselves to teams. On the one hand, this delegation of matching authority leads to a better use of agents’ decentralized information about optimal team composition. On the other hand, authority can be abused for opportunistic mismatching, which constitutes a new kind of moral-hazard problem. I show, under which conditions this problem arises so that the firm might even forgo self-organizing teams though being efficient.

Keywords: Abuse of authority; Limited liability; Mismatch; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:195-197

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.012

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