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Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints

Felix Jarman and Vincent Meisner

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 161, issue C, 96-98

Abstract: This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Revelation principle; Ex-post constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:161:y:2017:i:c:p:96-98