Deterministic Mechanisms, the Revelation Principle, and Ex-Post Constraints

Felix Jarman and Vincent Meisner
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Felix Jarman: University of Mannheim

No 32, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.

Keywords: mechanism design; revelation principle; ex-post constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints (2017)
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