Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?

Vera Angelova, Thomas Giebe and Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 166, issue C, 31-34

Abstract: If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents’ performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.

Keywords: Contest; Tournament; Real-effort; Experiment; Contract theory; Forward-looking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 J22 J33 L2 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Does a Short-Term Increase in Incentives Boost Performance? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:31-34

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.004

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