Does a Short-Term Increase in Incentives Boost Performance?
Vera Angelova (),
Thomas Giebe () and
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Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta: TU Berlin
No 60, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents\' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.
Keywords: contest; tournament; real-effort; experiment; contract theory; forward-looking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 J22 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-eff, nep-exp and nep-hrm
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Journal Article: Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance? (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:60
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