Sequential auctions and auction revenue
David Salant () and
Luis Cabral ()
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 176, issue C, 1-4
We consider the problem of a seller who owns K identical objects and N bidders each willing to buy at most one unit. The seller may auction the objects at two different dates. Assuming that buyer valuations are uniform and independent across periods, we show that the seller is better off by auctioning a positive number of objects in each period. We also provide sufficient conditions such that most objects should be auctioned at the first date or in the second date.
Keywords: Sequential auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:176:y:2019:i:c:p:1-4
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