The sound of silence: A license to be selfish

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Martin Dufwenberg and Stefano Papa

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 182, issue C, 68-70

Abstract: We theoretically formulate the idea that if a person stays silent in a situation where a promise could have been made, then he or she will subsequently act as if having a license to be selfish. We then report results from an experimental test that provides some support.

Keywords: Pre-fab promises; Trust game; Active-non-communication; Psychological costs; Cost of lying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:182:y:2019:i:c:p:68-70

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.045

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