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Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness

Claudia Cerrone () and Christoph Engel ()

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 183, issue C, -

Abstract: We test whether deciding on behalf of a passive third party makes participants less selfish in a subsequent decision on behalf of themselves. We find that, in a standard dictator game and in a modified dictator game that allows for ”moral wiggle room”, the experience of having decided for others does not mitigate selfishness

Keywords: Dictator game; Decision making on behalf of others; Order effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D30 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108616

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