Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance

Flip Klijn, Joana Pais () and Marc Vorsatz

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 186, issue C

Abstract: In the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if a school can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students’ true preferences and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using first-order stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools’ distributions over their actual matches, we find that schools’ welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle.

Keywords: School choice; Matching; Deferred acceptance; School quality; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 C92 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance (2019)
Working Paper: Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519304318

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108853

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