Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences
Bhavook Bhardwaj,
Rajnish Kumar and
Josue Ortega
Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 190, issue C
Abstract:
We study the cake-cutting problem where agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang and Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang–Wu and achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.
Keywords: Cake-cutting; Fair division; Single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Working Paper: Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300690
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109064
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