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Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences

Bhavook Bhardwaj, Rajnish Kumar and Josue Ortega

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang-Wu, and which achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.

Date: 2020-02, Revised 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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