Lying in a finitely repeated game

Avner Ben-Ner () and Fangtingyu Hu

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 201, issue C

Abstract: Do people lie less in repeated interactions with the same partner than in a series of one-shot interactions with strangers? We find that under asymmetric information, senders lie substantially less if paired with the same receiver than when randomly re-matched with different receivers. However, the lying gap diminishes if the receiver is allowed to offer feedback to the sender.

Keywords: Lying; Finitely repeated game; Feedback; Stranger–partner; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:201:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521000185

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109741

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