The impact of team incentives on performance in graduate school: Evidence from two pilot RCTs
John List and
Rohen Shah
Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 221, issue C
Abstract:
In organizations, teams are ubiquitous. “Weakest Link” and “Best Shot” are incentive schemes that tie a group member’s compensation to the output of their group’s least and most productive member, respectively. In this paper, we test the impact of these incentive schemes by conducting two pilot RCTs (one in-person, one online), which included more than 250 graduate students in a graduate math class. Students were placed in study groups of three or four students, and then groups were randomized to either control, Weakest Link, or Best Shot incentives. We find evidence that such incentive approaches can affect test scores, both in-person and online.
Keywords: Field experiment; Group performance; Incentives; Online education; Graduate school (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 I2 J3 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: The Impact of Team Incentives on Performance in Graduate School: Evidence from Two Pilot RCTs (2022)
Working Paper: The Impact of Team Incentives on Performance in Graduate School: Evidence from Two Pilot RCTs (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:221:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003688
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110894
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