Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 222, issue C

Abstract: We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as first raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)’s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents’ game.

Keywords: Competing mechanisms; Equilibrium existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals (2023)
Working Paper: Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:222:y:2023:i:c:s0165176522004062

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110932

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