Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals

Andrea Attar (), Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser
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Andrea Attar: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse
Gwenaël Piaser: IPAG Business School

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Abstract: We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as first raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)'s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents' game.

Keywords: Competing mechanisms; Equilibrium existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics Letters, 2023, 222, pp.110932. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110932⟩

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Journal Article: Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals (2023)
Working Paper: Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04216626

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110932

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