Are teams conditionally cooperative? Experimental evidence from a public goods game

Chenyang Xu and Tongzhe Li

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 239, issue C

Abstract: We study whether teams are conditional cooperators in a one-shot public goods game and to what extent this conditionality differs from that when decisions are made by individuals. Using a laboratory experiment, we find individuals in teams under a majority rule do not exhibit significantly different levels of conditionally cooperative behavior than individuals in isolation. Whereas individuals in teams under a random ballot rule are less conditionally cooperative than individuals in isolation.

Keywords: Teams; Public goods game; Laboratory experiment; Conditional cooperation; Peer influence; Majority rule; Random ballot (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C92 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:239:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002477

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111763

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