Bail-in in action

David Marques-Ibanez, Gianluca Santilli and Giulia Scardozzi

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 241, issue C

Abstract: In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis, the question of who should bear the burden of banking crises has been a cornerstone of the new supervisory framework in Europe. We evaluate the bail-in regulation (BRRD) for bank bond holdings using a proprietary database covering holdings of all euro-denominated securities. We focus on hard-to-value bailinable bank bonds and show that banks increased their holdings of bailinable bank bonds while households and non-financial corporations reduced their holdings of bailinable bonds issued by riskier banks.

Keywords: Bail-in; Bond holdings; Bond allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:241:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002489

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111764

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