Bail-in in action

David Marques-Ibanez, Gianluca Santilli and Giulia Scardozzi

No 2959, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis, the question of who should bear the burden of banking crises has been a cornerstone of the new supervisory framework in Europe. We evaluate the bail-in regulation (BRRD) for bank bond holdings using a proprietary database covering holdings of all euro-denominated securities. We focus on hard-to-value bailinable bank bonds and show that banks increased their holdings of bailinable bank bonds while households and non-financial corporations reduced their holdings of bailinable bonds issued by riskier banks. JEL Classification: G21, G28

Keywords: bail-in; bond allocation; bond holdings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec
Note: 328790
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Journal Article: Bail-in in action (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20242959

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