A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement

Bettina Klaus (), Flip Klijn and Jay Sethuraman

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 247, issue C

Abstract: We provide the first characterization of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism in the Shapley–Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) that uses respecting-improvement. Specifically, we show that for strict preferences, the TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying pair-efficiency, respecting-improvement, and strategy-proofness.

Keywords: Housing markets; Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism; Respecting improvement; Pair-efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:247:y:2025:i:c:s0165176524006293

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112145

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