A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement

Jay Sethuraman, Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

No 1468, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We provide the first characterization of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism in the Shapley-Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) that uses respecting-improvement. Specifically, we show that for strict preferences, the TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying pair-efficiency, respecting-improvement, and strategy-proofness.

Keywords: strategy-proofness; housing markets; market design; respecting improvement; top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism; pair-efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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Journal Article: A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement (2025)
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