Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders

Lisa Bruttel, Gerald Eisenkopf and Juri Nithammer

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 251, issue C

Abstract: In a Public Good experiment with an elected first-mover, we study how leadership candidates’ statements affect their election and followers’ contributions. Explicitly emphasizing efficiency and fairness boosts votes and contributions, but leader contributions remain the strongest predictor of follower behavior.

Keywords: Leadership; Public good; Voting; Communication; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:251:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001545

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112317

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