Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustín Bonifacio

Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 252, issue C

Abstract: In the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee, consistency, and non-obvious manipulability.

Keywords: Obvious manipulations; Consistency; Uniform rule; Allotment rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176525001818
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:252:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001818

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112344

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().