Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule

R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustín Bonifacio

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee, consistency, and non-obvious manipulability.

Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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