The virtue of being underestimated: a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models

Wendelin Schnedler

Economics Letters, 2002, vol. 75, issue 2, 171-178

Date: 2002
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models (2001)
Working Paper: The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models (2001)
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