Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information

Patrick Schmitz

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 1, 119-122

Abstract: Given symmetric information, in a standard hold-up problem a buyer's investment incentives are always increasing in his bargaining power. While this result is robust under one-sided private information, it can be overturned under two-sided private information.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information (2007)
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