Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information

Patrick Schmitz

No 6322, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Given symmetric information, in a standard hold-up problem a buyer's investment incentives are always increasing in his bargaining power. While this result is robust under one-sided private information, it can be overturned under two-sided private information.

Keywords: Hold-up problem; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
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Journal Article: Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information (2008)
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