Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case
Minoru Kitahara () and
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 1, 36-39
We analyze an election with costly information acquisition. We compare the outcome of a large election and that of a delegation. We show that the superiority between the two mechanisms is determined by the shape of the marginal cost function.
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