Commitment with renegotiable debt contracts and verifiable cash flow
Murat Usman ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 249-251
We study a Buyer-Seller relationship with one-sided relationship-specific investment. Debt commits the Seller not to trade at a low price even though it is renegotiable, and the cash flow is verifiable.
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