Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions

Gregory Pavlov ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 345-348

Abstract: We derive a bound on the seller's revenue loss in optimal auctions from unanticipated bidder collusion. The relative loss is rather small when there are few bidders. It is increasing with the number of bidders but at a slow rate.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Maximal Loss from Collusion in the IPV Symmetric Auctions (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:345-348

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