Maximal Loss from Collusion in the IPV Symmetric Auctions

Gregory Pavlov ()

No WP2006-037, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: We derive a bound on the seller’s relative revenue loss from an unanticipated bidders’ collusion in the optimal auctions. Under the standard hazard rate assumption the relative loss is at most 1 3 when there are just two bidders. The measure of the loss is increasing with the number of bidders, but at a rather slow rate.

Keywords: Collusion; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 09 pages
Date: 2006-07
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Journal Article: Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions (2008)
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