Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
Jozsef Molnar () and
Gábor Virág ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 360-363
We show that under post-auction market interaction revealing (hiding) information is revenue maximizing if the utility function is convex (concave) in the signaled type. Previous literature considered the sign of the first derivative with respect to the perceived type crucial.
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