Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling

Jozsef Molnar and Gábor Virág ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 360-363

Abstract: We show that under post-auction market interaction revealing (hiding) information is revenue maximizing if the utility function is convex (concave) in the signaled type. Previous literature considered the sign of the first derivative with respect to the perceived type crucial.

Date: 2008
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