Sustainable collusion on separate markets
Paul Belleflamme () and
Francis Bloch ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 384-386
In a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving each market, collusion is easier to sustain with production quotas if the fixed cost is small enough, and with market sharing agreements if it is large enough.
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Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2009)
Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2008)
Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2006)
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