Sustainable collusion on separate markets

Paul Belleflamme and Francis Bloch

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 384-386

Abstract: In a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving each market, collusion is easier to sustain with production quotas if the fixed cost is small enough, and with market sharing agreements if it is large enough.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(07)00319-9
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2009)
Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2008)
Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:384-386

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().