Sustainable collusion on separate markets

Francis Bloch and Paul Belleflamme

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Abstract: In a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving each market, collusion is easier to sustain with production quotas if the fixed cost is small enough, and with market sharing agreements if it is large enough.

Date: 2008
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Published in Economics Letters, 2008, pp.384-386. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.020⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2009)
Journal Article: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2008)
Working Paper: Sustainable collusion on separate markets (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00361679

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.020

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