Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 3, 577-580
In the standard property rights theory, joint ownership cannot be optimal, because it induces smaller investments in human capital than ownership by a single party. This result can be overturned if the parties have private information about the payoffs they can realize on their own.
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Working Paper: Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information (2007)
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