Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information

Patrick Schmitz

No 6478, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In the standard property rights approach to the theory of the firm, joint ownership cannot be optimal, because it induces smaller investments in human capital than ownership by a single party. This result holds under the assumption that bargaining is always ex post efficient due to symmetric information. However, joint ownership can be optimal if the parties have private information about the payoffs that they can realize on their own.

Keywords: Investment incentives; Joint ownership; Property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (2008)
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