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Economic juries and public project provision

Daniel McFadden

Journal of Econometrics, 2012, vol. 166, issue 1, 116-126

Abstract: Juries charged with evaluating economic policy alternatives are the focus of this study. The recruitment and management of juries is a principal–agent problem involving the design of incentive mechanisms for participation and truthful revelation of values. This paper considers a simple general equilibrium economy in which juries of consumers are used to estimate the value of public projects and determine their provision. The impact of participation fees on jury selection and representativeness, and on statistical mitigation of response errors, is analyzed. Manski set identification is used to bound selection bias and determine participation fee treatments that minimize welfare regret from imperfect jury findings.

Keywords: Set identification; Principal–agent problem; Juries; Welfare theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D60 D61 D71 D80 C42 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Journal of Econometrics is currently edited by T. Amemiya, A. R. Gallant, J. F. Geweke, C. Hsiao and P. M. Robinson

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Handle: RePEc:eee:econom:v:166:y:2012:i:1:p:116-126