Economics at your fingertips  

Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: A measurement error approach

Yonghong An

Journal of Econometrics, 2017, vol. 200, issue 2, 326-343

Abstract: This paper studies identification and estimation of two models for first-price auctions: (1) bidders’ beliefs about their opponents’ bidding behavior are not in equilibrium but follow “level-k” thinking, and (2) bidders’ values are asymmetrically distributed. Exploiting the nonparametric methodology developed for measurement error models (e.g., Hu, 2008), we show that both models can be identified by a unified methodology. The proposed methodology is applied to US Forest Service timber auction data and the estimation results suggest that bidders hold heterogeneous and non-equilibrium beliefs.

Keywords: First-price auctions; Measurement error models; Non-equilibrium beliefs; Asymmetric value distributions; Nonparametric identification and estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.014

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Econometrics is currently edited by T. Amemiya, A. R. Gallant, J. F. Geweke, C. Hsiao and P. M. Robinson

More articles in Journal of Econometrics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2022-05-02
Handle: RePEc:eee:econom:v:200:y:2017:i:2:p:326-343