 The law of large numbers for large stable matchingsJacob Schwartz and Kyungchul Song Journal of Econometrics, 2024, vol. 241, issue 1 Abstract: In many empirical studies of a large two-sided matching market (such as in a college admissions problem), the researcher performs statistical inference under the assumption that they observe a random sample from a large matching market. In this paper, we consider a setting in which the researcher observes either all or a nontrivial fraction of outcomes from a stable matching. We establish a concentration inequality for empirical matching probabilities assuming strong correlation among the colleges’ preferences while allowing students’ preferences to be fully heterogeneous. Our concentration inequality yields laws of large numbers for the empirical matching probabilities and other statistics commonly used in empirical analyses of a large matching market. To illustrate the usefulness of our concentration inequality, we prove consistency for estimators of conditional matching probabilities and measures of positive assortative matching. Keywords: Two-sided matching; Concentration inequality; Stable matching; Law of large numbers; Correlated preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:econom:v:241:y:2024:i:1:s0304407624000885 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2024.105742 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Econometrics is currently edited by T. Amemiya, A. R. Gallant, J. F. Geweke, C. Hsiao and P. M. Robinson More articles in Journal of Econometrics from Elsevier |
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