 Identification in discrete choice models with imperfect informationCristina Gualdani and Shruti Sinha Journal of Econometrics, 2024, vol. 244, issue 1 Abstract: We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. Leveraging the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by Bergemann and Morris (2016), we provide a tractable characterisation of the sharp identified set. We develop a procedure to practically construct the sharp identified set following a sieve approach, and provide sharp bounds on counterfactual outcomes of interest. Using our methodology and data on the 2017 UK general election, we estimate a spatial voting model under weak assumptions on agents’ information about the returns to voting. Counterfactual exercises quantify the consequences of imperfect information on the well-being of voters and parties. Keywords: Discrete choice model; Bayesian persuasion; Bayes Correlated Equilibrium; Incomplete information; Partial identification; Moment inequalities; Spatial model of voting (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:econom:v:244:y:2024:i:1:s0304407624001994 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2024.105854 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Econometrics is currently edited by T. Amemiya, A. R. Gallant, J. F. Geweke, C. Hsiao and P. M. Robinson More articles in Journal of Econometrics from Elsevier |
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