Political institutions behind good governance
David Bartolini () and
Raffaella Santolini ()
Economic Systems, 2017, vol. 41, issue 1, 68-85
The present paper investigates the role of political institutions — namely, political regimes and electoral rules — in shaping the capacity of the government to implement policies that address citizens’ preferences, i.e., “good governance”. The empirical analysis, conducted on a panel of 80 democratic countries over the period 1996–2011, shows that the performance of the government depends on the interaction between electoral rules and political regimes. In particular, the performance of a government under a presidential regime improves when associated with a majoritarian electoral rule, while it worsens with a proportional electoral rule.
Keywords: Electoral rule; Political system; Government effectiveness; Regulatory quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Political institutions behind good governance (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:41:y:2017:i:1:p:68-85
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