Political institutions behind good governance

Raffaella Santolini and David Bartolini ()

No 405, Working Papers from Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali

Abstract: The present work looks at the role of political institutions - political regimes and electoral rules - in determining the performance of the government to define and implement sound policies for the economy. The results of the empirical investigation on a panel of 80 democracies over the period 1996-2011, show an important impact of the political regime on the performance of the government - the presidential regimes reduces the quality of the government -, while electoral rules do not matter. However, the analysis shows that the interaction between political regimes and electoral rules plays a crucial role for the quality of the government. In particular, a presidential regime improves the government performance when associated with a majoritarian rule, while worsens it when combined with a proportional rule.

Keywords: electoral rule; government eectiveness; political system; regulatory quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law, nep-pol and nep-reg
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http://docs.dises.univpm.it/web/quaderni/pdf/405.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Political institutions behind good governance (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anc:wpaper:405

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